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Abstract : We consider the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD). We assume that play-
ers make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player’s
strategy is a function from the convex hull S of the set of payoffs into the set {C, D} (C
means cooperation, D – defection). S. Smale in [16] presented an idea of good strategies in
the repeated PD. If both players play good strategies then the average payoffs tends to the
payoff corresponding to the profile (C,C) in PD. We adopt the Smale idea to define semi-
cooperative strategies - players do not take as a referencing point the payoff corresponding
to the profile (C,C), but they can take an arbitrary payoff belonging to the β-core of PD. We
show that if both players choose the same point in the β-core then the strategy profile is an
equilibrium in the repeated game. If the players choose different points in the β-core then
the sequence of the average payoffs tends to a point in S. The obtained limit can be treated
as a payoff in a new game. In this game the set of players’ actions is the set of points in S
that corresponds to the β-core payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Robert Aumann in papers [2], [3], [4], [5] showed that if a payoff p of a normal form game
corresponds to a strategy profile belonging to the β-core then there exists a strong equilib-
rium in the repeated game providing the payoff p. The construction of the strong equilibrium
profile in the repeated game is rather complex and bases on the assumption that all play-
ers know the full history of the game. Our aim is to consider also the situation when players
choose strategies in the repeated game corresponding to different points in the β-core. Then,
in general, the course of the game seems heavy to forecast.
We consider two players Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with payoffs given by
C D
C (2, 2) (0, 3)
D (3, 0) (1, 1)
(1)
where C means to cooperate and D – to defect. The set of β-core payoffs for PD is presented in
Figure 1 (bold segments with ends (1, 2.5), (2, 2), (2.5, 1)).
Figure 1: The β-core of the prisoner’s dilemma
The β-core consists of payoffs which are Pareto optimal and individually rational. We
assume that in the repeated game players know only both players average payoffs from
the previous stages. So, a player’s strategy is a function from the convex hull S of the set
of vector payoffs into the set of his actions. The vector payoff function u given by (1), the
strategy profile s : S → {C, D}2 and an initial point x¯1 determine a sequence of average
payoffs x¯t by
x¯t+1 =
tx¯t + u(s(x¯t))
t+ 1
(2)
2
Figure 2: The semi-cooperative strategies
The strategies of player 1 and player 2 corresponding to a point v = (v1, v2) in the β-core
are presented in Figure 1. The strategies are called semi-cooperative strategies and are de-
termined by the point v and a positive constant ε. We show that for an arbitrary initial point
x¯1, the sequence of average payoffs x¯t is convergent to the point v when the strategy profile
s = sv consists of the semi-cooperative strategies corresponding to the point v. The profile
sv is a Nash equilibrium. The case v = (2, 2) was considered by S. Smale in [16]. The idea of
semi-cooperative strategies is motivated by Smale’s idea of good strategies.
The main problem, that we consider in the paper, is to study the limit properties of the
dynamical system given by (2) in the case when players 1 and 2 choose different points
v in the β-core – player 1 chooses point a and player 2 chooses point b. Our main result
formulated in Theorem 4.2 states that for an arbitrary initial point the sequence of average
payoffs is convergent and the limit is given by
xt −−−→
t→∞

a if a1 = b1
(2, 2) if a1 6 2 6 b1
b if a1 < b1 ≤ 2
a if 2 ≤ a1 < b1
≈ (1, 1) if b1 < a1
The Smale approach to the repeated PD has been recently applied in [1]. E. Akin showed
that if player’s 1 strategy s1 is simple, i.e.
s1(x) =
{
D if L(x) > 0
C if L(x) < 0
whereL(x1, x2) = ax1+bx2+c is an affine map such thatL(1, 1), L(3, 0) ≤ 0 ≤ L(2, 2), L(0, 3),
then every sequence of average payoffs is attracted by the interval {x ∈ S : L(x) = 0}, for
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arbitrary strategy of player 2. If both players adopt simple strategies then every sequence of
average payoffs tends to a point being the intersection of separation lines. In [1], the evolu-
tionary dynamics is used to analyze competition among certain simple strategies. The game
with the payoff given by Theorem 4.2 has a continuous strategy set. In the next paper we
intend to analyze its replicator dynamics using methods presented in [15].
2 Smale’s good strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
In this section we provide a brief presentation of Smale’s approach to the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma which was presented in [16].
Smale considers PD with payoffs given by (1). The players’ actions are interpreted as
follows: C means to cooperate and D – to defect1. The game is symmetric and the action D
dominates the action C for each player (3 > 2 and 1 > 0). The Nash equilibrium is the pair
of action (D,D) and the Nash payoff is (1, 1). The Nash payoff is not Pareto optimal. The
Pareto frontier contains two segments: the first one is jointing (0, 3) to (2, 2), the second one
– (2, 2) to (3, 0). Smale distinguishes one Pareto optimal payoff (2, 2).
He constructs a strategy profile in the repeated PD that is a Nash equilibrium with the
payoff equals to (2, 2). This kind of result can be treated as a special case of the Folk Theo-
rem. What makes Smale’s approach not typical is the way of choosing actions in each rep-
etition. At each stage, the players make their decision basing on the average vector payoffs
from the previous repetitions. It means that the domain of strategies is no longer the set of
histories but now it is the convex hull of the payoffs. Such strategies are called memory strate-
gies. Each player chooses his memory strategy before the iterated game is started. Players’
strategies are fixed during the iteration.
Let the function u : {C,D}2 → S be given by (1) where S denotes the convex hull of
all possible payoffs, i.e. S = conv{(2, 2), (0, 3), (3, 0), (1, 1)}. A memory strategy of player i
is a map si : S → {C,D}. A strategy profile is the pair s = (s1, s2) : S → {C,D}2. The
strategy profile s and an initial point x1 ∈ S determines the course of the repeated game in
the following way:
x1 := x1, xt+1 := u(s(xt)), xt+1 :=
x1 + · · ·+ xt+1
t+ 1
for t > 1.
The sequence (xt)t>1 is the sequence of payoffs and the sequence (xt)t>1 is the sequence of
average payoffs in the repeated game.
Fix ε > 0. A good strategy of player 1 is a map s∗1 : S→ {C,D} given by
s∗1(a, b) =
{
C if b < a+ ε and a ≥ 1 and b ≤ 2
D elsewhere in S
1Originally, in the paper [16], Smale understands the game (1) in the meaning of the arms race. In his paper
the action C is marked with E – easy – which means to disarm, and the action D is marked with T – tough –
means to arm.
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A good strategy of player 2 is a map s∗2 : S→ {C,D} given by
s∗2(a, b) =
{
C if a < b+ ε and b ≥ 1 and a ≤ 2
D elsewhere in S
The good strategies are illustrated on Figure 3.
Figure 3: Good strategies
The main result presented in section 1 of [16] is the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Smale). 1. If player 1 plays a good strategy s∗1 and player 2 plays an arbitrary
strategy s2 then the sequence of average payoffs xt = (x1t , x2t ) satisfies
lim inf
t→∞ x
1
t > 1 and lim sup
t→∞
x2t 6 2
for every x1 ∈ S.
2. If both players play good strategies s∗1, s∗2, then
xt −−−→
t→∞ (2, 2)
for every x1 ∈ S.
If the payoff in the repeated game is defined as the upper limit of average payoffs then
the strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) is a Nash equilibrium in the set of memory strategies.
The Banach limitLim is a continuous linear functional defined on the space l∞ of bounded
scalar sequences2 that is an extension of the functional which associates any convergent se-
quence with its limit. If the payoff is defined as a Banach limit of the sequence of the average
payoffs then the Nash equilibrium s∗ has an additional interesting property. The construc-
tion of good strategies guarantees that the deviating player’s payoff will not exceed the good
strategy player’s payoff by more than ε. We define the payoff in the repeated game by
u∞i (s, x1) = Limx
i
t for i = 1, 2.
2The definition and properties of Banach limit can be found in [9].
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Proposition 2.2. Suppose player 1 plays a good strategy s∗1. If s = (s∗1, s2), where s2 is an arbitrary
memory strategy of player 2, then
u∞2 (s, x1) 6 u∞1 (s, x1) + ε
for every x1 ∈ S.
It means that if player 1 plays a good strategy, then his payoff is not smaller than his
opponent’s payoff minus ε. But the constant ε is controlled by the player 1, so he can choose
it as small as he wish. In this sense, we can say that good strategies not only are Nash
equilibria in the set of memory strategies, but also they are safe Nash equilibria.
3 Some properties of the dynamical systems generated by memory
strategies
We consider a normal form game G = (N , (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , N} is the
set of players, Ai is a finite set of actions of player i and ui : A = A1 ×A2 × . . .×AN → R is
the payoff function of player i.
A memory strategy of player i is a function si : S → Ai, where S := conv{u(a) : a ∈ A}
is the convex hull of the set of vector payoffs u = (u1, u2, . . . , uN ). The strategy profile
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) determines a map f s : S→ S by
fs(x) = (u ◦ s)(x). (3)
and the dynamical system βs = (βst )t≥1
βst (x) =
tx+ fs(x)
t+ 1
. (4)
We say that a sequence (xt)t≥t0 ⊂ S is a trajectory of the dynamical system βs if
xt+1 = β
s
t (xt) (5)
Observe that if xt0 is the given average payoff after stage t0 then the trajectory (xt)t≥t0 ⊂ S
of the dynamical system βs given by (5) is the sequence of average payoffs
xt+1 =
t0xt0 + f
s(xt0) + . . .+ f
s(xt)
t+ 1
Since
βst (x¯)− x¯ =
fs(x¯)− x¯
t+ 1
and the set S is bounded, then
∀ε>0 ∃T ∀t>T ∀x¯∈S |βst (x¯)− x¯| < ε (6)
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So, for every ε > 0, there exists T such that for an arbitrary trajectory (xt)t≥t0 of the dynam-
ical system βs it holds
∀t>max{t0,T} |xt+1 − xt| < ε. (7)
The following proposition is the deterministic version of the Blackwell approachability
result (see [8]). An elementary proof is presented in [14].
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that a set W ⊂ S is closed and a trajectory (xt)t≥t0 of the dynamical
system βs satisfies
∀t ≥ t0, ∃yt ∈W, |xt − yt| = dist(xt,W ) and 〈xt − yt, f s(xt)− yt〉 ≤ 0. (8)
Then
lim
t→∞ dist(xt,W ) = 0.
The point yt in (8) is a proximal point in the set W to the point xt. If the set W is convex
and closed and fs(xt) ∈W for t ≥ t0 then (8) holds true. As a corollary from Proposition 3.1
we obtain that
Corollary 3.2. If the set W ⊂ S is closed and convex and a trajectory (xt)t≥t0 of the dynamical
system βs satisfies
∃t≥t0 ∀t>t fs(xt) ∈W, (9)
then
∀>0 ∃t>t ∀t>t xt ∈W .
Taking W = (−∞, c] in Proposition 3.1 we obtain the following property of real se-
quences.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that (an)∞n=1 is a bounded sequence in R and (a¯n)∞n=1 is the sequence of
arithmetic means, i.e. a¯n = 1n
∑n
k=1 ak.If we have
(a¯n > c ⇒ an+1 ≤ c)
for almost all n and a fixed constant c ∈ R, then
lim sup
n→∞
a¯n ≤ c.
Definition 3.4. Let s be a memory strategies profile. We say that a set Z ⊂ S is:
1. invariant for the dynamical system βs iff
∃tZ≥1 ∀x∈Z ∀t>tZ
tx+ fs(x)
t+ 1
∈ Z,
2. an escape set for the dynamical system βs iff every trajectory (xt)t≥t0 of the dynamical system
βs satisfies
∀τ≥t0 ∃t>τ xt /∈ Z.
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3. an absorbing set for the dynamical system βs iff every trajectory (xt)t≥t0 of the dynamical
system βs satisfies
∀τ≥t0 ∃t>τ xt ∈ Z.
In the next section we study limit properties of some dynamical systems generated by
memory strategies. To show that a trajectory is convergent to a point we will construct a
family of absorbing and invariant neighbourhoods of the limit points. Invariance is usually
easy to check. To show that a neighbourhood is absorbing we shall use the following lem-
mas.
Hereafter to the end of the section we fix a memory strategies profile s and consider the
dynamical system βs.
Lemma 3.5. Let V = convfs(S), ε > 0 and V  = A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ Z, where the sets A,B,C are
pairwise disjoint. Suppose that the set B ∪ C ∪ Z is invariant and A,C are the escape sets. If there
exist a convex set W ⊂ V ε and δ > 0 such that fs(B ∪ C) ⊂ W and W δ ∩ (B \ Z) = ∅ then the
set Z is absorbing.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that the set Z is not absorbing. Then there exists a
trajectory (xt)t≥t0 such that
∃t1>max t0,t ∀t>t1 xt /∈ Z
where t is from Corollary 3.2, such that xt ∈ V  for all t > t. Since the set B ∪ C ∪ Z is
invariant, there exists t2 := tB∪C∪Z such that βst (x¯) ∈ B ∪C ∪Z for every x¯ ∈ B ∪C ∪Z and
t > t2. Since A is an escape set then
∃t3 > max{t1, t2}, x¯t3 /∈ A
So, x¯t3 ∈ B ∪ C and by the invariance of the set B ∪ C ∪ Z we obtain that
∀t ≥ t3, x¯t ∈ B ∪ C ∪ Z
By Corollary 3.2, there exists tδ > t3 such that
x¯t ∈W δ for t > tδ
Since C is an escape set then there exists t¯ > tδ such that x¯t¯ /∈ C. So, x¯t¯ ∈ (B \ Z) ∩W δ,
which contradicts the assumption that (B \ Z) ∩W δ = ∅.
Lemma 3.6. Assume that a set D ⊂ S is invariant and absorbing and D = B ∪ Z. If there exists a
closed convex set W ⊂ S and ε > 0 such that f s(B) ⊂ W and W  ∩ (B\Z) = ∅ then the set Z is
absorbing.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that the set Z is not absorbing. Then there exists a
trajectory (xt)t≥t0 such that
∃t1>t0 ∀t>t1 xt /∈ Z.
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Since the set D is invariant and absorbing then there exists t2 > t1 such that
∀t > t2, xt ∈ D
So xt ∈ B \Z for t > t2. Thus, fs(xt) ∈W , for t > t2 and by Corollary 3.2 there exists tε > t2
such that xt ∈W  for t > tε. This is a contradiction to the assumption W  ∩ (B \ Z) = ∅.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that Z ⊂ S and fs(Z) ⊂W , where W is a closed convex subset ofS. If there
exists ε > 0 such that W ε ∩ Z = ∅ then Z is an escape set.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that Z is not an escape set. So, there exists a trajectory
(xt)t≥t0 such that
∃τ > t0, ∀t > τ, xt ∈ Z. (10)
So fs(xt) ∈ W for t > τ . By Corollary 3.2, there exists t > τ such that xt ∈ W  for all t > t,
which contradicts to (10) and the assumption W ε ∩ Z = ∅.
4 Semi-cooperative strategies
In this section we introduce semi-cooperative strategies in the repeated PD that are a gener-
alisation of Smale’s good strategies. The semi-cooperative strategy of a player is determined
by the choice of a point v in the β-core of PD and a positive constant. If both players choose
the same point v then the obtained strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium and the vector pay-
off in the repeated game equals to v. This can be regarded as a very special case of Robert
Aumann results presented in [2], [3], [4] and [5], where it was shown that each payoff from
the β-core of the stage game can be received as a strong Nash equilibrium in the repeated
game. Much more interesting is the situation when players choose semi-cooperative strate-
gies corresponding to different points in the β-core. The limits of trajectories of the dynami-
cal system determined by a semi-cooperative profile are described in Theorem 4.2, which is
the main result of the paper.
To recall the definition of the β-core assume that G is a normal form game like in Section
3. A correlated strategy cK of the coalition K ⊂ N is a probability distributions over (the
finite set) AK =
∏
i∈KAi. The set of correlated strategies of the coalition K is denoted by CK.
The correlated strategy cK of the coalition K and the correlated strategy cN\K of the anti-
coalition N \ K determine a correlated strategy c = (cK, cN\K) ∈ CN of the full coalition. In
the usual way we extend payoffs functions ui onto the set of correlated strategies CN .
A correlated strategy c˜ ∈ CN belongs to the β-core (c˜ ∈ Cβ(G)) iff
∀K⊂N ,K6=∅ ∃cN\K∈CN\K ∀cK∈CK ∃j∈K uj
(
cK, cN\K
)
6 uj(c˜). (11)
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Taking K = N in (11) we obtain that
∀c ∈ CN , ∃j ∈ N , uj(c) ≤ uj(c˜),
which is the weak Pareto optimum condition.
Taking a coalition K = {i} in (11) we obtain that the payoff u(c˜) is individually rational, i.e
∀i ∈ N , ui(c˜) ≥ min
cN\{i}∈CN\{i}
max
c{i}∈C{i}
ui(c
{i}, cN\{i}).
Hereafter G denotes the considered PD with payoffs given by (1). The set of Pareto optimal
and individually rational payoffs for G is illustrated in Figure 1. The β-core for PD (in fact
its image by u) is the sum of intervals
u(Cβ(G)) = {(x, 3− x
2
) : 1 ≤ x ≤ 2} ∪ {(3− y
2
, y) : 1 ≤ y ≤ 2}
Let us fix a point v in the β-core different to the end points, i.e
v ∈ u(Cβ(G)) \ {(1, 2.5), (2.5, 1)}.
Roughly speaking, player 1 cooperates if the average payoff is located below the line going
through the points (1, 1) and v. A semi-cooperative strategy of player 1, determined by the
point v and a positive constant ε > 0, is a map sv,ε1 : S→ {C,D} given by
sv,ε1 (x) =
{
C if x ∈ K1(v, ε)
D elsewhere in S
,
where
K1(v, ε) := (T1(v))
ε ∩ {x ∈ S : x1 > 1 and x2 6 v2}, (12)
and
T1(v) :=
{
x ∈ S : x2 6 v2 − 1
v1 − 1x1 +
v1 − v2
v1 − 1
}
.
A semi-cooperative strategy of player 2, determined by the point v and ε > 0, is a map
sv,ε2 : S→ {C,D} given by the formula:
sv,ε2 (x) =
{
C if x ∈ K2(v, ε)
D elsewhere in S
,
where
K2(v, ε) := (T2(t))
ε ∩ {x ∈ S : x1 6 v1 and x2 > 1}. (13)
and
T2(v) :=
{
x ∈ S : x2 > v2 − 1
v1 − 1x1 +
v1 − v2
v1 − 1
}
.
Semi-cooperative strategies are illustrated in Figure 1.
We say that player 1 is: an egoist if v1 > v2; an altruist if v1 < v2; a balanced player if v1 =
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Figure 4: The models of the players’ behaviour
v2(= 2). The second player is: an egoist if v2 > v1; an altruist if v2 < v1; a balanced player if
v1 = v2(= 2). This is illustrated in Figure 4.
If both players choose the same point v = (v1, v2) ∈ u(Cβ(G)) to determine their semi-
cooperative strategies, then the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. We obtain the follow-
ing result which is similar to Smale’s one.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that both players play semi-cooperative strategies sv,11 , s
v,2
2 determined by
the same v ∈ u(Cβ(G)) \ {(1, 2.5), (2.5, 1)} and positive constants ε1, ε2 > 0. If (x¯t)t≥1 is an
arbitrary trajectory of the dynamical system determined by the strategy profile (sv,11 , s
v,2
2 ), then
xt −−−→
t→∞ v.
If player 1 plays the semi-cooperative strategy sv,11 and player 2 plays an arbitrary memory
strategy s2 then an arbitrary trajectory (x¯t)t≥1 of the dynamical system determined by the strategy
profile (sv,11 , s2) satisfies:
lim inf
t→∞ x
1
t > 1 and lim sup
t→∞
x2t 6 v2.
Proof. Fix v ∈ u(Cβ(G)) \ {(1, 2.5), (2.5, 1)} and ε1, ε2 > 0. Let (x¯t)t≥1 be a trajectory of the
dynamical system βs
v
, where sv = (sv,11 , s
v,2
2 ) and f
v = u ◦ sv.
Let
∆ := K1(v, 1) ∩K2(v, 2)
Ω1 := S\K1(t1, 1)
Ω2 := S\K2(t2, 2)
The set ∆ is convex; the sets ∆, Ω1, Ω1 are pairwise disjoint and S = ∆ ∪ Ω1 ∪ Ω1. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: The partition of S
Observe that
fv (xt) =

(2, 2) if xt ∈ ∆
(3, 0) if xt ∈ Ω1
(0, 3) if xt ∈ Ω2
. (14)
To show that the trajectory (x¯t)t≥1 converges to v we construct an invariant and absorbing
neighborhood Oδ(v) of the point v. Fix δ ∈ (0,min {1, 2}). We will denote by l(a, b) the line
going through the points a, b ∈ R2. Set
l1 = l(Pδ, (3, 0))
l2 = l(Pδ, (0, 3))
l3 = l(Rδ, (2, 2))
(15)
where Pδ = (v1 − δ, v2 − δ) and Rδ is the intersection point of l2 and the line {x1 = v1}. The
half-plane over (under) a line l ⊂ R2 will be denoted by e(l) (h(l)). The neighborhood Oδ(v)
illustrated in Figure 6 is given by
Oδ(v) := e(l1) ∩ e(l2) ∩ e(l3) ∩ {x ∈ S : x1 6 v1 + δ}. (16)
To show that the neighbourhood Oδ(v) is invariant we divide it into three parts: Z1 :=
Ω1 ∩ Oδ(v), Z2 := Ω2 ∩ Oδ(v), Z3 := ∆ ∩ Oδ(v). By (7) there exists t1 > 1 such that for any
12
Figure 6: The neighbourhood Oδ(v)
t > t1
|βsvt (x)− x| < δ. (17)
If x¯ ∈ Z1 then fv(x¯) = (3, 0). So βsvt (x) ∈ e(l1). If t > t1 then βs
v
t (x) ∈ {x ∈ S : x1 <
v1 + δ, x2 > v2 − δ}. Since e(l1) ∩ {x ∈ S : x1 < v1 + δ, x2 > v2 − δ} ⊂ Oδ(v) we obtain that
βs
v
t (x) ∈ Oδ(v).
If x¯ ∈ Z2 then fv(x¯) = (0, 3). So βsvt (x) ∈ e(l2) ∩ e(l3). If t > t1 then βs
v
t (x) ∈ {x ∈ S :
v1 − δ < x1 < v1 + δ}. Since e(l2)∩ e(l3)∩ {x ∈ S : v1 − δ < x1 < v1 + δ} ⊂ Oδ(v) we obtain
that βs
v
t (x) ∈ Oδ(v).
If x¯ ∈ Z3 then fv(x¯) = (2, 2). So βsvt (x) ∈ e(l1) ∩ e(l2) ∩ e(l3). If t > t1 then βs
v
t (x) ∈ {x ∈
S : x1 < v1 + δ}. Since e(l1) ∩ e(l2) ∩ e(l3) ∩ {x ∈ S : x1 < v1 + δ} = Oδ(v) we obtain that
βs
v
t (x) ∈ Oδ(v).
So the neighbourhood Oδ(v) is invariant.
To show that the setOδ(v) is absorbing we set V = convfv(S) = conv{(2, 2), (0, 3), (3, 0)}
and
A = Ω1 ∩ V δ, B = ∆ ∩ V δ, C = Ω2 ∩ V δ, Z = Oδ(y), W = conv{(2, 2), (0, 3)}. (18)
The set B ∪ C ∪ Z is invariant and A and C are escape sets. We have fv(B ∪ C) ⊂W . There
exists a constant θ > 0 such that W θ ∩ (B\Z) = ∅ (See Figure 7). By Lemma 3.5, we obtain
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Figure 7: The illustration of the condition W θ ∩ (B\Z) = ∅
that the set Z = Oδ(v) is absorbing.
Since the diameters of the neighbourhoods Oδ(v) tends to zero as δ → 0, then we obtain
the convergence of the trajectory (x¯t) to the point v.
Now, we consider the dynamics of the system when player 2 chooses an arbitrary mem-
ory strategy and player 1 plays the semi-cooperative strategy sv,11 . If x¯
2
t > v2 then player
1 defects in the next stage and so, player’s 2 payoff belongs to {0, 1}. By Corollary 3.3, we
obtain that
lim sup
t→∞
x2t 6 v2.
The proof of the inequality
lim inf
t→∞ x
1
t > 1
is similar.
If players have no opportunity to agree the choice of the point v then we should not
expect that they will choose the same point. We can treat the choice of the point v as an action
of a player in a new game. To define payoffs in this new game we have to know the payoffs
in the repeated PD when players 1 and 2 play semi-cooperative strategies corresponding to
points a, b, respectively, in the β-core. The main result of the paper concerns this situation in
the following.
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Theorem 4.2. Let a = (a1, a2), b = (b1, b2) ∈ u(Cβ(G)) \ {(1, 2.5), (2.5, 1)} and ε1, ε2 > 0. If
(x¯t) is an arbitrary trajectory of the dynamical system determined by the strategy profile (s
a,ε1
1 , s
b,ε2
2 ),
then
xt −−−→
t→∞

a if a1 = b1
(2, 2) if a1 6 2 6 b1
b if a1 < b1 ≤ 2
a if 2 ≤ a1 < b1
yε1,ε2 if b1 < a1
where yε1,ε2 is a point in S and
yε1,ε2 −−−−−→
ε1,ε2→0
(1, 1).
The case a = b was considered in Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Set s∗ = (sa,11 , s
b,2
2 ), f
∗ = u ◦ s∗ and
δ0 :=

min
{
1
4 ,
2
4 ,
||a−b||
4
}
if a1 < b1 6 2 or 2 6 a1 < b1
min
{
1
4 ,
2
4 ,
||a−(2,2)||
4 ,
||b−(2,2)||
4
}
if a1 6 2 6 b1
min
{
1
4 ,
2
4 ,
||yε1,ε2−(1,1)||
4
}
if b1 > a1
(19)
For δ ∈ (0, δ0) there exists tδ > 1 such that the condition (17) is satisfied for t > tδ .
We denote by β∗ the dynamical system determined by the strategy s∗, i.e. β∗t (x¯) =
tx¯+f∗(x¯)
t+1 .
Set
∆ := K1(a, 1) ∩K2(b, 2)
Ω1 := K2(b, 2)\∆
Ω2 := K1(a, 1)\∆
Ω3 := S\(K1(a, 1) ∪K2(b, 2))
. (20)
If a1 ≤ b1 then Ω3 = ∅. The case a1 = b1 has been proved in Theorem 4.1.
In the case a1 < 2 ≤ b1 we set V = conv{(0, 3), (2, 2), (3, 0)} and observe that V ε ∩ ∆ is
absorbing (comp. Corollary 3.2). Since f∗(x) = (2, 2) for x ∈ V ε ∩ ∆ and (2, 2) ∈ V ε ∩ ∆
then every trajectory is convergent to (2, 2).
The case a1 ≤ 2 < b1 is symmetric to the above one.
The case a1 < b1 < 2 is illustrated in Figure 8.
We construct two neighbourhoods of the point b:
Oδ(b) := e(l1) ∩ e(l2) ∩ e(l3) ∩ {x ∈ S; x1 6 b1 + δ}.
Uδ(b) := Oδ(b) ∩ {x ∈ S : b1 − δ 6 x1}.
where the lines l1, l2, l3 are given by (15) for Pδ = (a1−δ, a2−δ) andRδ being the intersection
point of l2 and the line {x1 = b1}. Invariance of the sets Uδ(b), Oδ(b) is a conclusion from its
construction (see Figure 9). By Lemma 3.5, we obtain that the set Oδ(b) is absorbing using
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Figure 8: The partition of Swhen a1 < b1 < 2
Figure 9: The neighbourhoods Oδ(b)
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the same notation as in (18). To obtain that Uδ(b) is absorbing we apply Lemma 3.6 setting
D = Oδ(b), Z = Uδ(b), B = D \ Z, W = conv{(3, 0), (2, 2)}.
The case 2 < a1 < b1 is symmetric to the case considered above.
The last situation is b1 < a1. Two possible choices of a and b are presented in Figure 10.
Obviously, we have
Figure 10: On the left – the partition of S when both players are egoists and on the right –
the partition of Swhen b1 < a1 and player 1 is the altruist and the player 2 is the egoist
f∗(x) =

(2, 2) if x ∈ ∆
(3, 0) if x ∈ Ω1
(0, 3) if x ∈ Ω2
(1, 1) if x ∈ Ω3
.
The limit of an arbitrary trajectory is a point y = yε1 ε2 which is the intersection cl(∆)∩cl(Ω3).
Let Pδ ∈ Ω3 be the unique point satisfying dist(Pδ,Ω1) = dist(Pδ,Ω2) = δ. Set
l1 = l(Pδ, (0, 3))
l2 = l(Pδ, (3, 0))
l3 = l((1, 1), b)
l4 = l((1, 1), a)
l5 = l(Pδ, y
ε1 ε2)
(21)
We construct the neighbourhood of the set ∆:
Oδ(∆) := ∆
δ ∪ (h(l1) ∩ h(l2) ∩ h(l3) ∩ e(l4))
which is illustrated in Figure 11.
We show that Oδ(∆) is invariant. Fix x¯ = (x1, x2) ∈ Oδ(∆) and t > tδ. Set C := h(l1) ∩
h(l2) ∩ h(l3) ∩ e(l4).
Consider the case x¯ ∈ Ω1 and x2 > y2. Then x¯ and f∗(x¯) = (3, 0) belong to h(l2) ∩ h(l3).
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Figure 11: The neighborhood Oδ(∆)
So β∗t (x¯) ∈ h(l2) ∩ h(l3). Since dist(x¯, h(l4)) ≥ ε1 > δ then dist(β∗t (x¯), h(l4)) > 0 and so
β∗t (x¯) ∈ e(l4). Since dist(x¯, e(l3)) < ε2 then dist(β∗t (x¯), e(l3)) < ε2 + δ. We have {z ∈ S :
dist(z, e(l3)) < ε2 + δ} ∩ h(l2) ⊂ h(l1). So β∗t (x¯) ∈ h(l1). Thus we obtain that β∗t (x¯) ∈ C ⊂
Oδ(∆).
If x¯ ∈ Ω1 and x2 6 y2 then β∗t (x¯) ∈ Oδ(∆).
The case x¯ ∈ Ω2 is symmetric to the above one.
In the case x¯ ∈ Ω3 observe that x¯ and f∗(x¯) = (1, 1) belong to the convex set C. Thus
β∗t (x¯) ∈ C.
In the last case x¯ ∈ ∆, we have β∗t (x¯) ∈ ∆δ.
To obtain that Oδ(∆) is absorbing we set
A := e(l5) \Oδ(∆) ⊂ Ω1 ∪ Ω3,
B := (h(l5) ∩ Ω3) \Oδ(∆),
C := Ω2 \Oδ(∆),
Z := Oδ(∆),
V := S,
W := conv{(1, 1), (0, 3)}
(22)
and we apply Lemma 3.5. The above sets are illustrated in the Figure 12. The set B ∪ C ∪ Z
is invariant and the sets A, C are escape sets. We have f∗(B ∪ C) ⊂ W . The neighbourhood
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Figure 12: The sets A, B and C in one possible situation when b1 < a1
Oδ(∆) is defined in such way that there exists a constant θ > 0 such that
W θ ∩ (B\Z) = W θ ∩B = ∅.
By Lemma 3.5, the neighbourhood Oδ(∆) is absorbing.
We define the neighbourhood Oδ(y) of the point y by
Oδ(y) := Oδ(∆) ∩ e(l6),
where l6 is the line given by the equation: x1 + x2 = y1 + y2 − δ.
Using similar arguments as in the proof of the invariance of Oδ(∆) we show that Oδ(y) is
invariant. Set D = Oδ(∆), Z = Oδ(y), B = D \ Z and W = conv{(0, 3), (2, 2), (3, 0)}. By
Lemma 3.6, we obtain that Oδ(y) is absorbing.
Since the diameter ofOδ(y) tends to zero as δ → 0, then y is the limit of an arbitrary trajectory
in the considered case.
Using elementary calculations we obtain that the distance between the point yε1 ε2 and
the point (1, 1) equals to
ε1 + ε2 +
√
(ε1 + ε2)2 + 4ε1ε2 tan2 α
2 tanα
,
where α denotes the angle between lines l((1, 1), a) and l((1, 1), b).
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